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The multiplicity of actors involved in proliferation-sensitive transactions and their inherent complexity require adjustments not just of the concepts and language, but also of related laws as well as licensing and enforcement mechanisms. The focus of non-proliferation efforts has shifted from the physical movement of goods to analysis of which elements of a transaction are relevant to, and should be subject to, controls. These developments not only create challenges, but also offer new opportunities for international cooperation. The main forums where states meet to discuss how to maintain effective export controls on items that may be used in nuclear, biological and chemical weapons as well as missile delivery systems for them are the Australia Group (AG), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-use Goods and Technologies (WA). The intangible transfer of technology (ITT), enforcement and penalties, best and proven practices for effective export controls, and engagement with non-participating states are being discussed across the different regimes. In recent years, the European Union (EU) has also increased its cooperation with non-EU countries at working level through technical assistance programmes. In 2009 the EU adopted an updated and strengthened version of the 2000 Dual-use Regulation. The revised document introduces EU-wide powers to control transit and brokering for dual-use items that may be intended for use in connection with weapons of mass destruction or their delivery systems. During 2009, a new directive to facilitate the movement of defence goods inside the EU also entered into force. Adapted from the source document.

In recent years, a central issue for the states that cooperate in the development of export control laws on security-related items has been whether a principle of discrimination or a principle of global equity should underpin their efforts. Recently, there has been support for a hybrid approach to tighten controls on a small number of countries of concern, while allowing technology to flow freely within trusted communities of countries. In developing guidelines, export control regimes have emphasized objective criteria that minimize the risk of divergent national interpretations when making licensing decisions. In 2008 the Nuclear Suppliers Group modified the way in which supplier guidelines are applied to exports of controlled items to India. Changes to export control rules & procedures inside the European Union in 2008 highlight the general importance of dedicating sufficient resources to implement & enforce export controls across the EU. Adapted from the source document.

In 2006 the United Nations Security Council adopted resolutions restricting access by Iran and North Korea to international supplies of certain proliferation-sensitive items. These resolutions form part of the overall effort to persuade Iran and North Korea to change their national nuclear policies in order to achieve nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament goals supported by the international community. However, if they are to be effective, the restrictions laid down by the Security Council will require all UN member states to apply their national export controls. The number of countries that participate in informal groups to strengthen national export controls has grown continuously since the mid-1990s. The states that participate in these groups have all adopted national legislation to ensure that proliferation-sensitive items are assessed and authorized by national authorities prior to export. However, participation in this cooperation is far from universal. The number of participants in the relevant groups ranges from 34 partners in the Missile Technology Control Regime to 45 partners in the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Law enforcement communities have recently begun to strengthen their cooperation under the Proliferation Security Initiative in an attempt to impede and stop illegal shipments of proliferation-sensitive items. This cooperation could help to ensure that illegal shipments of proliferation-sensitive items do not reach their intended end-users in cases where it has not been possible to prevent export. Adapted from the source document.

The high level of support in 2005 for two recent initiatives -- UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) -- suggests a growing awareness of the need to pay the same attention to enforcement of export controls that has been paid to the development of modern and comprehensive legislation. There is growing sensitivity to the need to include the widest possible participation in these efforts to strengthen export control, and to base future efforts on cooperation to implement agreed international standards. The need to accelerate the adoption of the highest international standards through national laws and regulations continues to stimulate demand for export control outreach and assistance. The export control regimes have all continued their active outreach efforts, and both the EU and Japan have been considering how best to help the USA finance and deliver assistance in the quantities needed and to the locations where there is demand. Export controls are being applied in new functional areas as part of the wider effort to adapt arms control to a changing security environment. A new EU regulation on trade in goods that could be used for capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment extends export controls beyond the realm of military or strategic products in pursuit of human rights objectives. To help achieve counter-terrorism objectives, many of the member states of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are examining how export controls might reduce the risk of acquisition and use of radiological weapons by non-state actors. The need for broader participation in the development and implementation of international standards has been accompanied by a growing discussion of the need for discrimination, both negative and positive, between recipient countries. The long-standing support for closer scrutiny of exports to countries widely recognized to represent proliferation challenges may, at some point, tip into support for technology denial. Adapted from the source document.

There were new developments in 2003 in all four international informal export control regimes (the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technology), as well as in export control-related policies in the European Union and international non-proliferation disarmament and assistance efforts. During 2003 activities in the export control regimes focused on adapting export controls to achieve two objectives: first, to combat the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons (and missile delivery systems for them); and second, to combat terrorism. There has been a particular focus on measures to prevent the acquisition of weapon of mass destruction-related materials and technology as well as man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) by groups planning terrorist acts. The MTCR amended its agreed Guidelines to ensure that all participating states have 'a legal basis to control the export of items that are not on a control list, when such items are destined for missile programs'. Participating states also agreed to apply controls to the transfer of technology by intangible means, for example, via email or by word of mouth. States participating in the Wassenaar Arrangement changed the founding document to include an exchange of information on transfers of small arms and light weapons and MANPADS. States agreed to strengthen export controls on MANPADS, arms brokering and unlisted items that can be used for both military and civilian purposes. The European Union took steps to ensure that export controls remain effective in the enlarged EU. National controls on the export of dual-use items are being evaluated, and the first fundamental review of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports is under way. Effective export control in the majority of new EU member states is undermined by their exclusion from one or more of the information exchanges that take place in the export control cooperation arrangements. Full participation by all EU member states in all regimes will be a critical issue in 2004. In 2003, governments participating in the G8 Global Partnership Against Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction eliminated obstacles to the implementation of some international non-proliferation and disarmament assistance projects. In 2004 projects to eliminate chemical weapons and dismantle decommissioned nuclear-powered submarines in Russia are expected to be the main focus of activity. Adapted from the source document.

Russian-US nuclear arms control The momentum behind treaty-based approaches to nuclear arms control and disarmament was highlighted in 2011 by the entry into force of the 2010 Russia-USA Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START), which mandated additional reductions in the two parties' strategic offensive nuclear forces. The parties implemented on schedule the inspections, data exchanges, notifications and other measures set out in the treaty's cooperative monitoring and verification regime. In establishing this regime -- one of the treaty's main achievements -- New START continued an arms control process through which Russia and the USA have redefined their strategic relationship. There were questions about the next steps in Russian-US arms control. Both sides acknowledged that making further cuts in their nuclear arsenals would require expanding the bilateral agenda to address tactical nuclear weapons and non-deployed warheads as well as broader strategic stability issues. The most prominent of the latter related to ballistic missile defence, which was the focus of an intensifying dispute in 2011. There was also recognition that deeper cuts in their respective strategic nuclear arsenals would require bringing the three other nuclear weapon states recognized by the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) into a multilateral nuclear arms-reduction process. Adapted from the source document.

The international debate and associated activity regarding the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have moved on from the traditional focus on controlling exports to encompass a wider range of activities, including the control of transit, trans-shipment, financing and brokering. This reflects the evolving nature of procurement for WMD programmes and the need to adopt new legal concepts and enforcement tools to counter the threat that a state or non-state actor will obtain or develop WMD. Accordingly, to implement United Nations Security Council resolutions and wider trade control norms, countries have started to enhance and expand domestic, regional and international capacity-building efforts and technical assistance. This applies in particular to Resolution 1540, which imposes binding obligations on all states to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery. During 2010 the UN concluded a series of regional and sub-regional seminars to raise awareness and assist implementation. The EU responded to Resolution 1540's requirements by adopting a revised regulation on dual-use items in 2009 which expands controls beyond exports to transit and brokering. In 2010 the EU began to broaden the geographic and thematic scope of its non-proliferation cooperation. Complementing the enhanced international cooperation are coercive measures designed to change the behaviours of states and non-state actors that are widely considered to pose threats to international security. These include UN sanctions that seek to counter proliferation finance and interdict the movements of proliferation-related items. In the case of proliferation finance, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has proved itself to be a relatively effective vehicle for exploring the issue and developing guidance on implementing counter-measures. Adapted from the source document.